

based approach indicates is that the problems of the national bourgeoisie and their hoped-for solutions differed widely. Perhaps it would have been better to label them the national bourgeoisies.

Upon the Peronists' return to power, the CGE got its chance to offer solutions, as Gelbard was for a time economic minister and wielded a great deal of power. However, his social pact was probably bound to fail, since no one could control the swirling social forces that had been unleashed. The CGE and its dream of nationally based industry were destroyed by the military after 1976.

Given the state of archives in Argentina, researching this book was a Herculean effort. The consideration of source material from a series of provincial archives, and not always the most obvious, has made possible an awareness of complexity that would have been impossible without it. Like all good books, this one raises lots of questions. For example, if other provinces were examined, would the vision of the problems and politics of the national bourgeoisie change, and how much? Also, how much of the collapse after 1955 of many sectors of industry resulted from deepening industrialization and the shifts in the world economy? Do we need to rethink our discussions of the nature of populism in light of this book? This excellent book tells the reader a great deal about the economics and the politics of the crucial 30 years between 1946 and 1976. All interested in Argentina's distressing collapse during that period should read this work.

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Uruguay's José Batlle y Ordóñez: The Determined Visionary, 1915–1917.

By MILTON I. VANGER. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010.

Photographs. Map. Tables. Notes. Index. xi, 295 pp. Cloth, \$49.95.

In 1963, when Milton Vanger published *José Batlle y Ordóñez of Uruguay: The Creator of His Times, 1902–1907*, he introduced to English-speaking audiences the Uruguayan leader who created the western hemisphere's first welfare state. Vanger followed up in 1980 with *The Model Country*, a study of Batllista Uruguay between 1907 and 1911, and a promise to complete later Batlle's life through 1929. This third study represents yet another thorough examination of Uruguayan domestic politics from Vanger.

Vanger focuses on Batlle's failed attempt to alter the Uruguayan constitution and implement one of the most far-reaching reforms: the collective executive or Colegiado. Batlle felt, according to Vanger, that the Colegiado "was designed to prevent presidential dictatorship [but that] its fundamental mission would be to carry out an explicit Colorado Party program from which no single elected official . . . could decide to deviate" (p. 239). Leaving his supporter Feliciano Viera as president in 1915, Batlle used the Colorado Party's resources to elect a constitutional convention to implement his goal. To do so, Batlle masterminded the passage of educational and labor reforms, most importantly the eight-hour workday, pragmatically to win Batllista convention delegates. Neverthe-

less, when Uruguayan voters selected delegates in July 1916, the result was a “disaster” for Batlle (p. 137). His supporters represented a minority in the convention vis-à-vis Nationalists (Blancos) and Anticolegialist Colorados, both of whom saw in Batlle’s project the seed of perpetual Batllista rule. Shortly thereafter, President Viera issued his famous halt (*alto*) to further reforms. The election results confirmed for Vanger that “Uruguay was a conservative society, over Batlle’s view that Uruguay was a new country open to advanced ideas” (p. 141).

Nevertheless, Vanger continues with Batlle’s attempt to rescue his program and his beloved Colegiado after the convening of the October 1916 Constitutional Convention. Not to be deterred, Batlle and especially Viera united the Colorado Party behind workers and won legislative elections in January 1917. His political popularity revived, Batlle threatened to encourage Colorado abstention of the postconvention constitutional plebiscite, thus negating what was becoming an increasingly conservative document, and to have the legislature, which elected the president under the 1830 Constitution, select Batlle for a third presidential term. Though Vanger asserts Batlle used his own election as a ruse, it worked. This nightmare scenario for the Nationalists and Anticolegialist Colorados catalyzed them into compromise, and the Constitution, ratified by 95 percent of those voting in November 1917, included provisions for a president with oversight of the Ministries of War, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, while a nine-member Council of State oversaw the other ministries. The document also prevented a president from being reelected until eight years had passed from his previous term, a provision the Nationalists insisted upon and that obviously targeted Batlle. Even though Batlle failed to implement fully the Colegiado, Vanger’s interpretation of Batlle has not changed over 50 years. As in Vanger’s previous studies, Batlle comes off as a forward-thinking idealist—a determined visionary “whose principal goal was social equality” (p. 269) for all Uruguayans—but also an astute politician who deftly used the Colorado Party to advance his program.

The reader should commend Vanger for his thoroughness. Instead of focusing on merely Batlle or the Colorado Party, the author views politics from all sides and effectively understands the intricacies of Batllista-era domestic politics. To do so, Vanger uses a variety of primary sources, including Batlle’s newspaper *El Día*, party meeting minutes, and most importantly Batlle’s personal papers, which have yet to be released publicly.

One can question Vanger on two counts. First, Vanger downplays the effects of World War I in Uruguay. Granted, he discusses the economic dislocations of the war and the seizure of eight German ships in Montevideo after the 1917 US entrance into the conflict. Even so, Vanger ignores Batlle’s fear of the large German population in southern Brazil, readily evident in *El Día* throughout 1917, which would have augmented the discussion of Batlle’s motivations in supporting the Allies. Likewise, Vanger does not discuss in any detail the role of the United States, to which Uruguay initially leased the ships. Effectively, Vanger’s discussion of the war seems inserted as an afterthought. Second, Vanger’s very brief chapters (28 chapters cover 259 pages of text) disrupt the narrative flow, and some chapter titles mislead the reader. For example, the 7-page chap-

ter entitled "Education" devotes space to asphaltting of Montevideo's streets, and sewer building, in addition to education reform.

Nevertheless, these minor faults do not significantly detract from the quality of Vanger's book. Overall, *Uruguay's José Batlle y Ordóñez* conclusively demonstrates Batlle's idealism and political acumen and the nuanced shifts in Uruguayan politics. Students of Uruguayan history must not overlook this title.

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Intellectuals and Left Politics in Uruguay, 1958–2006: Frustrated Dialogue.

By STEPHEN GREGORY. Brighton, Eng.: Sussex Academic Press, 2009. Table. Notes. Bibliography. Index. vii, 234 pp. Cloth, \$74.95.

The relationship of intellectuals to political power has been an important theme since ancient times. It is no less so today and has been an increasing focus of culture studies, especially in the Latin American context, where the history of democratic governance has been spotty at best. The plague of repression that Latin America experienced in the 1960s and 1970s also engulfed Uruguay, the country with the most democratic political culture in Latin America. This volume seeks to explain the contribution that intellectuals made to Uruguay's political process, the frustration of that process during the military dictatorship (1973–85), and the opportunities afforded to the intellectual community by the restoration of democracy and the left's electoral success in recent years.

It has been said that at least until the 1950s, Uruguay's political parties lacked intellectuals, and intellectuals had no political parties. All this changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s as Uruguay's economic and political stagnation led to an increasingly polarized social and political process resulting in the emergence of a military dictatorship in 1973. This dictatorship drove most intellectuals into silence and/or exile.

Stephen Gregory has done his homework in terms of reading the output of Uruguay's intellectuals since the middle of the previous century. However, tying their output to the political process and to governing is another matter. This book is meant for the specialist, but what makes it less accessible is not its subject matter but the opaque writing style of the author. Ideas should be exciting, but the too-often stilted language in this volume does not help bring the ideas to life. This is unfortunate since the connection of intellectuals to the left in Uruguay, a left that has now won a second consecutive presidential election, makes the subject more relevant than ever. The author knows this and makes a good case for the importance of his subject, but his style gets in the way.

Gregory does a good job in reviewing the production of Uruguay's intellectuals prior to the dictatorship. He successfully captures their preoccupation with Uruguay's stagnation and the frustrated attempt by these culture workers to convince their fellow citizens to vote for the left in 1971. The military then suspended any possibility of intellectuals and the left having space in the public arena. As Gregory correctly points out, this

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